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Almost all models of market behaviour in some way or another, suppose some causality between 
news or information, and market prices. This study seeks to explore the relationship between 
information and the behaviour of investors. Specifically, it will examine the impact of Stock 
Exchange News Service Announcements (SENS Announcements) on trading volumes. 
5 Declaration 
I declare that this paper is my own work except where indicated otherwise and that all references 
that were used have been accurately recorded in this paper. 
6 Background and Literature Review 
In order to appreciate how information may impact the market, it is necessary to review existing 
models of investor behavior and, in particular, the Efficient Market Hypothesis. This discussion 
should lead the reader to realize that investor sentiment should impact the market. It should also 
become apparent that information (news) is one of the key drivers of investor valuations, and, 
hence, that the impact of information that modifies investor perceptions should be discernable in the 
market. 
6.1 The Efficient Market Hypothesis 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), introduced by Fama in 1970, has dominated the field of 
Financial Economics.  The hypothesis defines an efficient market as one in which security prices 
always, instantaneously and fully, reflect all relevant available information. It states that equity 















Until relatively recently the hypothesis stood unopposed: significant empirical evidence had been 
found supporting it, and the theory’s adoption had been widespread. In 1978 a prominent EMH 
economist Michael Jensen claimed: “There is no other proposition in economics which has more 
solid empirical evidence supporting it than the Efficient Market Hypothesis” (Jensen, 1978 in Lo & 
MacKinlay, 1988: 42). 
 
However, subsequent to Jensens’ boast, the EMH has been questioned, challenged and empirically 
undermined (See Roll, 1988; Shleifer 2000; Lo & MacKinlay 1988; Ferreira & Smith, 1999; Cottle, 
1987: 27). 
 
The EMH is underpinned by three arguments (Shleifer 2000: 2): 
 Investors are assumed to act and take decisions rationally. In particular, they will value 
securities in a rational manner. 
 Irrational decisions by some investors will be offset by the decisions made by other 
irrational investors. 
 If the irrational investors decisions do not net each other off, rational arbitrageurs will 
capitalize on the deviation from the rational equilibrium, and hence restore that equilibrium. 
6.2 Problems with the EMH 
In his book, “Inefficient Markets,” Shleifer (2000) draws on many authors to show 
comprehensively that these assumptions cannot hold.  
6.2.1 Rationality of Investors 
Shleifer notes that individual investors frequently do not conduct themselves rationally. He draws 














point. He also references Kahneman and Tversky (1979) who show comprehensively that people 
tend to conduct themselves irrationally, and irrationally in the same manner. That is, their random 
deviations from fundamental values are not normally distributed and hence will not net each other 
off. (Shleifer, 2000: 10-12; his inferences from these authors works are corroborated in Traverso, 
2000: 17). 
 
But, it is not just individual investors that Shleifers’ discussion addresses. He also explores the 
rationality of professional and institutional investors. Again, he references a wide range of authors 
who show that this category of investors also indulge in “noise” trading. Principally these criticisms 
relate to how the performance of these traders is assessed. Professional investors are judged by the 
market on their performance relative to each other, as well as relative to the major indexes. As such, 
the fund managers tend to mimic each other’s portfolios, and the indexes. They indulge in window 
dressing, and buy stocks that have recently performed well. (Shleifer, 2000: 12-13). 
 
In a later chapter, Shleifer (2000: 112-145) establishes a model of investor sentiment that builds on 
the psychological traits of “conservatism” and “representativeness.” He is able to plausibly model 
sentiment (Shleifer, 2000: 141-143). He also references several different models that variously, and 
effectively, model sentiment in different ways. 
 
Other authors attest to different manifestations of the same irrationality: 
 Nofsinger (2001: 1354) refers to a “disposition effect” where individuals hold “loser” shares 
too long, and sell “winners” too soon.  















Clearly investors are not rational in the manner assumed by the EMH. 
6.2.2 The Impossibility of Arbitrage 
Shleifers’ argument does not dwell on the rationality of investors. In terms of the EMH, even if 
investor-trading patters are irrational and correlated (i.e. impacted by sentiment), the existence of 
arbitrageurs in the market should force prices back to their fundamental values. 
 
Arbitrageurs are specialist traders who profit from the deviations in stock prices, from the 
fundamental values of those shares (Blake, 1990: 9). Sharpe and Alexander in Shleifer (2000: 3) 
define arbitrage: “the simultaneous purchase and sale of the same, or essentially similar, security in 
two different markets at advantageously different prices.” Shleifer (2000: 3-4) explains how Fama 
(1965) and Friedman (1953) use this definition to show how th  EMH will hold in the face of shifts 
in market sentiment.  
 
Shleifer (2000: 13-16) shows that perfect substitutes do not generally exist in the market (this is 
corroborated, if indirectly, by other authors. For example, Roll (1988: 565). Even when they do, 
arbitrageurs do not necessarily tak  advantage of the opportunities. The companies Royal Dutch and 
Shell merged on a 60:40 basis in 1907 and today their shares are traded on nine exchanges. Royal 
Dutch is a member of the S&P 500 index, and Shell a member of the LSE FTSE. In an efficient 
market, Royal Dutch should trade at 1.5 times the value of Shell. However, as the graph in Figure 1 















Figure 1 Royal Dutch and Shell 
 
In his argument, Shleifer (2000: 33-52; 89-111) shows the existence of irrational individuals (noise 
traders) in the market creates risk, both for themselves, and for arbitrageurs.  
 
His assumptions are that arbitrageurs’: 
 Invest within finite horizons; 
 Generally invest other peoples’ money. 
And that: 
 Market sentiment (or, the perceptions of noise traders) is random. 
 
This last assumption implies that whenever an arbitrageur takes a position in response to a deviation 
from fundamental values, it is possible that the situation becomes “more extreme” before it reverts 














years to occur. But, at some point in the future, the arbitrageur will have to report on his 
performance, to his investors. 
 
This need to report, coupled to the risk that the arbitrage opportunity may widen before it narrows, 
limits the arbitrageurs’ ability to take long-term positions, and, indeed, to trade in the face of the 
market. Riskless arbitrage is thus not possible. 
 




Very few arbitrageurs have the resources to fly in the face of investor sentiment for as long as Mr 
Buffet.  
 
Shleifer builds on the agency relationship between the arbitrageur and his investors and defines a 
model that essentially de-links the demand for equities by arbitrageurs, from the expected return on 















Shleifer also examines the relationship between creditors and arbitrageurs. Hedge funds utilise 
significant leverage in their dealings. If there is a significant negative shift in prices before there is 
an improvement, the value of the shares held as collateral may decline to the point where there is a 
significant incentive for banks to call the loan. This threat will also mitigate against long-term 
arbitrage. 
 
It is apparent that arbitrage does not occur in the manner predicted by the EMH.  
6.2.3 Random Walks 
Blake (1990: 243-245) models the EMH using a fair game model: 
 
  (1) 
 
Where: 
  The actual return on share  in period . 
  Represents the information available in period . 
  The expected return on share  in period , given the 
information available in period . 
  A normally distributed random error term for share  in 
period . 
 
It follows from the EMH, that share prices should always impound all available information about 
the share price. In other words, the best estimate of the future share price is the current share price 
(Blake, 1990: 245; Roll, 1988: 541). As such (Blake, 1990: 245): 






















  (2) 
 
Substituting (2) into (1) gives: 
  (3) 
 
Essentially, this states that the best estimator of tomorrows share price (as one’s returns are 
determined by the change in share price), is the price today, plus an indeterminable amount ( ) that 
is a function of the information that becomes available between now and then. Of course this is 
unknowable. 
 
The formula given in (3) defines a random walk (Blake, 1990: 245). As such, we should expect 
prices to move in accordance with this random walk function (Blake, 1990: 245; Shliefer 2000: 2; 
Lo and MacKinlay, 1988: 44) and it should not be possible now, to predict the change in the share 
price in the future. Note that Shleifer (2000: 2) states that Samuelson and Mandelbrot proved the 
idea of a random walk as a theorem in 1965 and 1966 respectively. 
 
However, in a paper published in 1988, Lo and MacKinlay show that share prices do not follow a 
random walk (However, they very elliptically stop short of rejecting the EMH. On page 42 they 
state: “…our test results may be interpreted as a rejection of some economic model of efficient price 
formation…”). 
 
Interestingly, Traverso (2000: 16) states that Fama (the originator of the EMH) in collaboration 
with French, have questioned his earlier findings. 
 















Again, we can conclude that the EMH does not hold. 
6.3 Ramifications 
The ramifications of the failure of the EMH are pronounced. Notably, the Modigliani-Miller models 
are significantly undermined. In a paper published in 1958, Modigliani-Miller asserted that the 
capital structure of a firm does not matter (Brigham, 1996: 365). The proof of this relies on the 
concept of riskless arbitrage (Brigham, 1996: 366; Shleifer, 2000: 184). We have seen above that 
riskless arbitrage is not possible. Therefore, capital structure and dividend policy definitely matter. 
 
Another key part of corporate finance theory that is jeopardized is the Black and Scholes option 
pricing model: “One specific implication of our empirical findings is that the standard Black-




“As soon as arbitrage is limited, investor sentiment and conduct begin to matter and it no longer 
suffices to focus only on cash flows and news. The world of finance becomes much more 
difficult and less elegant, but perhaps more accurate as well. In this world, different investors 
form different models of the future and trade with each other. Trading volume is substantial, 
especially when different models lead to similar predictions, investors try to buy the same 
securities at the same time, thereby driving up prices without any fundamental news.” (Shleifer, 
2000: 183). 
 
It is the relationship between this trading volume and investor sentiment (“models” in Shleifer’s 














6.4 Information and Markets 
Numerous studies suggest that information does indeed impact the market (Karpoff, 1987; 
Nofsinger, 2001; Roll, 1988; Ferreira & Smith, 1999; McQueen & Roley, 1993; Shleifer, 2000).  
 
The literature is less clear on the details of this relationship. Karpoffs’ survey mentions several 
possible linkages (Karpoff, 1987: 113-117): 
 Copeland’s “sequential arrival of information” which postulated that information flows from 
one trader to the next. 
 Epps and Epps’ “Mixture of Distributions Hypothesis (MDH)” This model suggests that 
price changes are a function of the with-in day information arrivals. 
 Clark, Tauchen and Pitts, and Harris build on the MDH suggesting that the transaction time 
intervals are variable. 
 Pleiderer speculates that private information is only partially aggregated by the market 
because of noise emanating from life cycle trading. 
 
Of these explanations, it would seem that the MDH carries the most weight and seems to 
correspond best with observed data. Interestingly, none of the models imply a relation between the 
observed relationship between volume and price change (Karpoff, 1987: 116). 
 
This author postulates that it is more relevant to focus on the impact of information within the 
market, rather than the mode of dissemination. The latter is a complex subject that is both 
empirically very difficult to quantify, or to measure. However, almost all models, in some way or 
another, suppose some causality between news or information, and market prices. These linkages 
















From Random Walks (page 11,), Equation (1): 
  (1) 
In this equation,  represents the information available in period . We can see the 
presumed relevance of information in the model. 
 Shleifers’ Model of Investor Sentiment 
Shleifer (2000: 114-127) finds evidence for under-reaction and over-reaction to news 
announcements. He has established a model that describes this. Importantly, his model is 
founded on the impact of information. 
 The Selection Problem 
In a discussion on asymmetric information in financial markets, Hillier explores the credit 
markets’ response to information asymmetries. He is able to explain both the credit market, 
and the need for equity markets in terms of these asymmetries. The models hinge on the 
availability of information. In his model, it is the knowledge of the probability of the success 
or failure of a venture that is pertinent (in this case, the entrepreneur is presumed to have a 
better understanding than the banks). (Hillier, 1997: 7-35.) 
 Macroeconomic News and the Stock Market 
McQueen (1993: 685) presents a model, “conditional on information available at time t” 
based on the Dividend Discount Model. 
6.5 What constitutes information? 
The models described above offer some suggestions as to what constitutes information. 
  















Hillier’s discussion (“The Selection Problem”) on the role of information in financial markets 
begins (Hillier, 1997: 8): 
  (4) 
Where: 
  The expected return of all projects (average). 
  The probability of the project succeeding. 
  Project specific return on project . 
  The return in the event the project fails. 
 
Information constitutes anything that causes us to revise our assessment (or perception) of any of 
these variables. 
 
This model accords with Shleifers’ Model of Investor Sentiment (2000: 178) which suggests that 
anticipated future earnings must be higher, or perceived risk lower, for stock prices to rise. 
 
Blake (1990: 134) gives the established (Cottle, 1987: 565) Dividend Discount Model as follows: 
  (5) 
Where: 
  Fair price of the share. 
  Expected dividends per share in year . 
  Cost of capital for a firm in this risk category or the “required 

































Both the “required rate of return” and the “expectation” above implicitly incorporate the investors 
assessment of information and again we may assert that information is anything that causes an 
investor’s assessment of these variables (Equation 5) to change.  
6.6 Information and the EMH 
The EMH requires that the market responds instantaneously and immediately to new information. 
Against this theory, it is difficult to meaningfully assess volume and price changes that occur over 
time. However, this paper has shown that there are considerable shortcomings with the EMH 
(indeed, information is not assimilated in the manner assumed by the EMH (Roll, 1988: 558; 
Karpoff, 1987: 116; McQueen, 1993: 694; Ferreira, 1999)).  
 
By stepping back from the EMH, we can examine other phenomena within the market and so 
attempt to better our understanding of markets.  
 
The remainder of this section examines how the assimilation of information can impact the market. 
6.7 How does the impact of new information manifest itself in the 
market? 
It is commonly held that a price change is reflection of the market changing its expectations of the 
value of a share. The associated volume is felt to be an indication of the extent to which individual 
investors interpret the information differently. (Karpoff, 1987: 110). 
 
Specifically, Karpoff (1987: 120) argues that: 















 The correlation is between (volume) and  (the change in price). 
 is higher when prices increase than when prices decrease. 
 
It has been shown that the market does in fact react to information. For example, McQueen & Roley 
(1993) show that prices react to macro-economic news.  
 
Further, it is interesting to note that several authors have found that “stale information” impacts on 
share prices: 
 Ferreira & Smith (1999) examine how shares react to articles based on older, publicly 
available information. 
 Shleifer (2000: 115-117) discusses a study by Bernard (1992) in which stocks are shown to 
take up to sixty days to incorporate earnings announcements into their prices.  
 Several authors have detected autocorrelation or lagged relationships in share prices 
histories (Nofsinger, 2001: 1342; Shleifer, 2000: 121).  
6.8  Previous Studies 
6.8.1 The impact of public information on investors 
Nofsinger (2001) examines the trading behavior of individual and institutional investors in reaction 
to company specific news as published in the Wall Street Journal. News articles were collected for a 
three-month period. They were classified on a variety of characteristics, including length. Abnormal 














6.8.2 Stock price reactions to recommendations in the Wall Street Journal 
“Small Stock Focus” column 
Ferreira (1999) et al explore the impact of editorial articles on investor sentiment. They categorize 
the articles over a six-month period. Abnormal returns were determined using a standard event 
study methodology. They then test for abnormal returns in these stocks, and also explore possible 
relationships to trading volume and article type. An eleven-day event window was used. 
6.8.3 Market Efficiency in Real-Time 
Busse (2002: 416) shows that positive news impacts prices on the NASDAQ and NYSE, within 
seconds, for up to between one (positive news) and fifteen minutes (negative news). 
6.8.4 Testing for the Johannesburg Stock Exchange as an Efficient Market 
Traverso (2000) attempts to find evidence of abnormal returns on the JSE by forming portfolios 
based on Value (as per Gordon) and Contrarian investment strategies. He also tests for mean 
reversion. 
 
He finds that neither of these strategies provides conclusive evidence (Traverso, 2000: 65; 108). 
Despite this conclusion, they do suggest “inefficiencies were present on the JSE for the 1988-1998 
period” (Traverso, 2000: 110).  
 
In his discussion on mean reversion, Traverso’s draws on Bradfield and Ardington. They examined 
the period 1980 to 1996 and found some evidence of market inefficiencies (Traverso, 2000: 111). 
However, Traverso (2000: 126) was not able to reproduce this for longer periods of observation. 















Traverso (2000: 126) is quick to criticize Bradfield and Ardington on the size of their sample. 
However, despite suggesting that he is drawing on the entire set of listed companies (Traverso, 
2000: 52), he never comprehensively describes his data, and his sample for testing “Value 
Strategies” would appear to be relatively small (Traverso, 2000: 56). His Contrarian investigation 
uses a sample of 200 companies, but again the data are not detailed (Traverso, 2000: 89). 
6.8.5 The Impact of public news regarding potential take-overs on the share 
price behavior of target companies 
In a study published in 1999, Bhana (1999A) examines the impact of information on the JSE. In 
particular, his paper examines the reaction of shares before and after the first public disclosure of a 
merger. He finds that the share price starts rising approximately twenty days before the public 
disclosure of the merger. His sample included 37 companies that undertook mergers, and 97 that did 
not. He uses daily returns and constructs a portfolio study spanning the period January 1985 to 
December 1996. 
6.8.6 The share price reaction on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange for 
special (extra) dividend announcements 
Bhana (1998) examined the JSE for the twenty year period from 1975 to 1994 and found that share 
prices react positively to announcements by companies that they will be paying a special dividend 
(this accords with the predictions of the Dividend Discount Model described on page 16). For an 
event window of forty days prior to the announcement through to one day after the announcement 















6.8.7 Other Studies 
Several other authors (Van der Merwe (1996); Page (1992); Muller (1999); Henn (1997); Bhana 
(1999B)) have examined the impact of information and market efficiencies on the JSE.  
6.9 Testable Metrics 
6.9.1 Abnormal Returns 
These are calculated in several pertinent studies (Nofsinger, 2001; Shleifer, 2000: 122; Ferreira, 
1999; Bhana (1998)). These can be calculated using the following formula (De Bondt and Thaler in 
Traverso, 2000: 20): 
   (6) 
Where: 
  Abnormal return in period t. 
  The return on stock j in period t. 
  The return on the market in period t. 
The results of such an examination allow us to establish if the markets’ expected return has 
changed. This follows from equations (4) and (5) on page 15. 
6.9.2 Volumes 
Given the strong relationship between volume and information assimilation (Karpoff, 1988; 
discussed: page 17) Nofsinger (2001: 1347) defines a measure of abnormal individual trading 
















6.9.3 The Order Book 
It would seem that the order book (or “market depth”) can provide meaningful clues as to how 
investor sentiment is changing. 
7 Formulation of a Null Hypothesis 
7.1  Information and the JSE 
There is: “a general duty for companies to disclose circumstances, events or new developments that 
could have a material effect on their financial position or share prices” (JSE, 2003C). Conveniently 
for this study, the JSE listing requirements require companies to publish “SENS announcements” 
disclosing price-sensitive information through the JSE Stock Exchange News Service (SENS). 
Further, the information may not be disclosed publicly or to any individual or group, until it has 
been published through the SENS system. (JSE, 2003C). 
 
Consequently, SENS announcements should catalyze a reassessment by individual investors, of 
their perception of 
 
or P0 (Equations 4 and 5 respectively).  
7.2 How does the impact of new information manifest itself in the 
market? 
As discussed above, it can be seen that a price change reflects a change in the market’s assessment 
of the variables that drive iR  or P0 in Equations 4 and 5 on page 16.  
 
For example (with reference to Figure 2 below and to Equation 5 on page 16), assume that an 
investor believes that a share is correctly valued at its current equilibrium price of P1. If the investor 















generate, will increase, he will increase his valuation of the share to P2. If the share remains priced 
at P1, the investor will engage in arbitrage until the share is correctly priced at P2. (This behavior 
can be observed, in an uncontrolled environment, by watching the currency crosses as Mr 
Greenspan pronounces on US interest rates). In effect, the supply and demand curves have shifted 











Figure 2 Changing Market Equilibriums 
Karpoff (1987: 110) suggests that the volume generated in reaction to such a price change is an 
indication of the extent to which individual investors interpret the information differently. 
 
It is also possible that investors’ perceptions may change without there being a change in the 
















Figure 3 Demand and Supply Changes without a change in the Equilibrium price 
Even in this scenario, the changing assumptions of the individual investors will result in buying and 
selling of shares as the investors shift their positions on the supply and demand curves until a new 
equilibrium is established. Thus, we should expect to see an increase in volumes traded in reaction 
to SENS announcements. It is the existence of these volumes that this paper seeks to explore. 
 
Importantly, however, Shleifer (2000: 183) suggests that it is possible for prices to change, without 
news (see page 13). This agrees with Karpoff (1987) as discussed on page 17. As already noted, this 
study will only concern itself with the impact of news in the market. It does not attempt to assess 
the behavior of participants in the market or the mechanism whereby information is propagated 
through the market (see page 14) . 
7.3 Null Hypothesis 
From the preceding discussion, we can formulate a null hypothesis (H0): Firm specific SENS 
























Studies have shown that news can have a discernable impact on volumes in the market within very 
short (seconds) timeframes (Busse (2002: 416)). 
 
This author did not encounter any prior studies of news and market efficiency on the JSE that have 
considered intraday trade information. Inevitably, closing price information is used (for example, 
Bhana (1999A; 1999B)), and frequently, index data is used rather than actual share data (for 
example van der Merwe (1996); Henn (1997)).  
 
This propensity to utilise closing price data is also apparent in overseas studies, and Nofsinger 
(2001:1342) notes that relatively few authors explore trade at an intraday level (although he does 
cite some exceptions). Many studies do, however, view the market from a longer term perspective. 
Notably: 
 Ferreira (1999) et al explore the impact of the editorial articles on investor sentiment using 
an eleven-day event window. 
 Roll (1988: 541) looks at both daily and monthly timeframes. 
 Shleifer (2000: 115-117) discusses a study by Bernard (1992) in which stocks are shown to 
take up to sixty days to incorporate earnings announcements into their prices.  
 
Closing price data is probably used, because: 
 it is more readily available, 














 the smaller volume of data is significantly more manageable. 
 
However, there are meaningful drawbacks to this approach. Blume and Stambaugh (1983: 389-391) 
in Page (1992), state that: “the use of closing prices contains a bias due to the ‘bid-ask’ effect and 
‘non synchronous trading’.” Indeed, if it were possible to use closing price data to assess the impact 
of news on a trading day, intuitively it would seem that the announcements would have to occur 
nearer the start of the day, or, at worst, to be normally distributed through the day. Figure 5 below, 
reflecting the distribution of SENS announcements during the trading day, clearly suggests that this 
is not the case: 
 
Figure 4 Hourly distribution of announcements during trading day 
More practically, in a study such as this one, blindly accepting closing price information will 









































beneficial and even necessary (for example, it may be unclear when information contained in a 
newspaper article was released or published), Figure 4 clearly suggests that masking the time of the 
announcement would be inappropriate in this analysis as many announcements occur after the 
market has closed. These announcements can not impact volume on that trading day. If the 
announcement caused a reaction, it could only manifest itself on the following trading day. 
 
The precise time that a SENS announcement was published is known. Furthermore, the trades that 
took place after the announcement was made can easily be identified. It is therefore possible to 
relatively easily construct experiments that consider the impact of news much more directly. This is 
the approach that this study will adopt. 
8.2 The Aim 
We wish to construct an experiment or experiments that allow us to assess our null hypothesis (that 
firm specific SENS announcements have no impact on stock exchange trading volumes on the JSE). 
 
The timing of SENS announcements is shown in Figure 4 above and the distribution may be 
summarised as follows: 
Before the market opens 528 
First half of trading day (9 AM to 1 PM) 914 
Middle of the trading day (11 AM to 3 PM) 966 
Last half of trading day (1 PM to 5 PM) 1 267 
After the market closes 597 














As the impact of announcements is not known, five independent tests will be constructed, each 
testing one of these relatively arbitrary groupings. Specifically, the five independent series 
(“experiments”) will be defined by grouping the data into periods in the following manner: 
 For announcements falling before the opening of the market, or after the close of the market 
on the preceding day (“Trading Day” experiments) 
o all trades on that day will be assessed; 
o all trades between 9 AM and 1 PM will be assessed.  
 Additionally, the trading day will be broken into three segments and periods defined 
accordingly (“Intraday” experiments):  
o 9 AM to 1 PM (deliberately excluding all announcements made while the market 
was closed); 
o 1 PM to 5 PM; and  
o 11 AM to 3 PM. 
 
Periods in which an announcement is made in the first half of the “Intraday” period, or while the 
market is closed in the case of the “Trading Day” experiment, will be declared “News” periods (see 
“Categorisation of Periods” on page 48 for specifics). 
 
To ensure that the volumes measured in a period are reasonable, if an announcement occurs for a 
company, in the second half of any period, that period will be discarded for that experiment, for that 
share, for that trading day. Further, if an announcement occurs in the two hours preceding an 
“Intraday” period, that period will be discarded. For the “Trading Day” experiment, days on which 















This study will assess the entire market. It will then repeat the assessment for the following JSE 
defined groupings of shares: 
 Top Companies Banding (“ZA01”) 
 Medium Liquid Banding (“ZA02”) 
 Less Liquid Banding (“ZA03”) 
 Financial 15 (“J212”) 
 Top 40 (“J200”) 
 Industrial 25 (“J211”) 
 Resource 20 (“J210”) 
8.3 Why not order book information? 
The markets’ order book also provides clear indications of changes and differences in investor 
sentiment. However, the order book suffers from some limitations: 
 Orders are free to place and may simply be speculative or opportunist. 
 It does not include all orders. For example, fill or kills orders will never be reflected in the 
market depth. 
For these reasons, this study will adopt a trade driven metric. 
8.4 A Testable Metric 
Nofsinger (2001: 1346) defines a measure of standardized, individual trading volume:  
 





























  Company number 
  Period 
  Total number of periods in sample (one period is required for each 
day, and on page 41, 162 days are identified for inclusion in the 
study) 
  The number of shares of company  traded in period . 
Restated, this equation defines a standardized trading volume for each share, for each period, by 
dividing the volume in a period, by the average volume traded in each period, for each equity. If 
this value is greater than one, the share experienced abnormal trading on that day. If it is less than 
one, it experienced unusually little trade. 
 
Certain macro-economic events or announcements (as well as day-of-the-week or seasonal events) 
will impact all shares equally. To eliminate this concern, a cross sectional average (across all the 
companies), is calculated for each period: 
 
   (8) 
Where: 
  Number of companies in sample (441 companies were eventually 
included in the sample. See page 38.) 
 
Note that the average of these values (Equation 4) should again be 1. 
 



























  (9) 
 
It should thus be apparent that the average  should be 0. 
 
The results will be collated for each equity, for each period (71 442 periods per experiment). As 
discussed on page 28, each period will then be categorised as a “News” or “No News” period, or it 
may be rejected (please also see “Categorisation of Periods” on page 48). 
8.5 A Testable Hypothesis 
Initially we stated our null hypothesis as: Firm specific SENS announcements have no impact on 
stock exchange trading volumes on the JSE. We may now restate this as: The mean level of 
abnormal trading should be higher in samples where announcements have been made, than in 
samples where no announcements have been made. 
 






Specifically, for each experiment, we will construct a set of comparable 
 values (from Equation 9), categorised into “news” and “no 
news” groupings. The mean of these  values will be 
calculated for each category. Finally these means will be compared using a statistical Z-test 
























The experiments will then be repeated for each of the groupings of shares identified on page 29. 
8.6 Formal Methodology 






8.6.2 Step 2 
We will use a one tailed test of significance, at the 1% level:  
8.6.3 Step 3 
  (11) 
 
  (12) 
 
Where:  
  Mean of the “No News” sample. 
  Standard deviation of sample. 
  Number of elements in sample. 
  Standard error of the differences of sample means (the standard 






























8.6.4 Step 4 
Reject H0 if z < -2.326. 
8.6.5 Step 5 
Calculate Z. 
8.6.6 Step 6 

















Nofsingers’ (2001: 1342 - 1343) study was based on a collection of New York Stock Exchange 
trades know as the Torq dataset. From this dataset he extracted all the trades for the period of his 
study: 1 November 1990 through to 31 January 1991. He then: 
 Grouped all the shares in the dataset, by market capitalisation, into ten sorted pools. 
 Thereafter, fifteen stocks were randomly selected from each of the ten groups of shares; 
 This sample of 150 shares was reduced by six stocks that ceased tradi g during the study. 
 “Market order” trades where both the buyer and the seller type (institutional or individual 
investor) could be identified were selected. 
 This resulted in a pool of 921 400 trades, from an initial population of 1.78 million trades. 
Only the volume component was assessed. 
 
In contrast, very few studies of the JSE have had this depth of data to draw on. Further, the 
relatively small number of companies listed on the JSE and the relatively low liquidity of the 
market, also results in a “survivorship bias”, where many companies from an initial sample are 
eliminated because they de-list, or cease to trade (see Page, 1992).  The largest studies are seldom 
able to consider more than two hundred shares (for example, Muller (1999) and Traverso, (2000: 
89)), and more generally, consider far fewer (Bhana’s (1999B) uses a sample of one hundred 
shares; Traverso’s sample in his test of “Value Strategies” would appear to be relatively small 
(Traverso  (2000: 56))). Sometimes, the eventual sample size is not disclosed (for example, 














9.2 The Data 
This study uses data sourced from Moneymax, a division of McGregorBFA. The data consists of 
the raw data feeds covering the period 15 November 2002 (data prior to this date did not include 
SENS records) through to 31 July 2003 (inclusive), or 175 trading days.  In order to make the 
dataset more manageable, only SENS Announcement and trade report information was obtained 
from the provider. This initial sample included 2 239 541 data points. 
 
 
Figure 6 Data Points Per Trading Day in initial unfiltered 175 day dataset 
The eventual size of the sample reduced to 441 companies, who traded 1 795 810 times and issued 































































































































































































































Liquid Less Liquid Financial 15 Top 40 Industrial 25 Resource 20
Number of 
Companies Trading 1 157                 437                    40 84 313 15 41 24 20
Number of Trades 2 145 801          1 795 810           1377508 293793 124509 412748 1398792 438696 628678
Volume 30 236 722 244  15 173 561 553   7359159755 3980773780 3833628018 3272349346 7391701309 3244706530 1414731273
Number of 
Companies making 
announcements 450                   393                    40 80 273 15 41 24 20
Number of 
Announcements 4 210                 3 255                 767 750 1789 244 805 303 426















The study is concerned with the impact of News (SENS Announcements), on companies listed on 
the JSE. To ensure that meaningful comparisons could be made across the entire duration of the 
study shares had to be listed for the entire period from 15 November 2002 to 31 July 2003. This 
was checked by comparing the JSE closing price file from 15 November 2002 (JSE, 2003A), to the 
equivalent file from 31 July 2003 (JSE, 2003B). On this basis, 1 158 equities were identified as 
being eligible to participate in the study. Notably, Telkom was excluded as it was not listed on 15 
November. 
 
Within the market, the JSE groups all instruments in five bandings: 
 JSE Top Companies; 
 Medium Liquid; 
 Less Liquid; 
 Special Products (warrants, waves and other derivative products); and, 
 the NSX Market (Namibian Stock exchange). 
 
The derivative market functions quite differently to the equities market. As such, all members of the 
Special Products banding were excluded. Unfortunately, during the period under review, the JSE 
reclassified warrants and waves from the liquidity bandings, to Special Products. Worse, a minority 
of equities appear not to have been reclassified. As such, a comprehensive list of all warrants and 
waves was obtained from SAWarrants (2003), and these were eliminated from the population. 
 
Shares in the Namibian Stock Exchange banding (whose trade and other data was included in the 















Effectively, to be included in the study, the shares had to be listed for the entire period, and 
included in the JSE Top Companies, Medium Liquid or Less Liquid bandings. Ultimately, 447 
companies were eligible to be included in the study, of which 437 traded (1 795 810 times) and 393 
companies published 3 306 announcements. Only 6 stocks neither traded, nor released an 
announcement, resulting in an effective population of 441 companies. 
9.4 Additional Data 
The provider supplied listings of the constituent shares within the: 
 Financial 15 Index; 
 Top 40 Index; 
 Industrial 25 Index; 
 Resource 20 Index; and 
 the JSE Market Bandings  
 
Subsequently, the detail (body text) of the SENS announcements assessed in the first part of the 
study, were supplied by Moneymax. Data on holdings, subsidiaries and investments was obtained 
again from Moneymax (but, in this case, ultimately from McGregor-BFA). 
 
McGregor-BFA provided market capitalisations for fifteen randomly selected shares in each of the 














9.5 Problems with the data 
While the data provider could supply a checked closing price feed, they were not able to provide 
similar warranties for the raw feed. Therefore, the data was checked for reasonability and integrity 
using sequence information provided as part of the feed, by the JSE. 
 
It was noted that certain days were missing data: 
 
 
Figure 8 Percentage of missed entries for each record type 
To compensate for this, all days on which more than 2% of either the trade or SENS information 


























































































































Trading Date Total Data 
Points 










13 Dec 2002           25 797            25 357            440            312  60  1.23% 13.64% 
09 January 2003             8 863              8 652            211         3 155             -    36.47% 0.00% 
27 January 2003           21 134            20 674            460            473  429  2.29% 93.26% 
28 January 2003           15 140            14 706            434            410             -    2.79% 0.00% 
11 March 2003           13 907            13 551            356            346             -    2.55% 0.00% 
13 March 2003           14 334            13 986            348         1 015             -    7.26% 0.00% 
17 March 2003           10 613            10 270            343            738             -    7.19% 0.00% 
19 March 2003           14 907            14 438            469            323              7  2.24% 1.49% 
04 April 2003           13 230            13 004            226            576            13  4.43% 5.75% 
09 April 2003           10 123              9 650            473            302             -    3.13% 0.00% 
11 April 2003             9 015              8 669            346            614             -    7.08% 0.00% 
30 May 2003           15 358            14 624            734              21           
101  
0.14% 13.76% 
09 July 2003           10 060              9 835            225                2              6  0.02% 2.67% 
Overall Total     2 239 541       2 145 801       93 740       10 903  631    
Figure 9 Days excluded because of missing data points 
















Figure 10 Day distribution of excluded days 
Consequently, the number of days in the study reduced from 175 to 162, and the volume of raw data 
declined by 8% from 2 239 541 to 2 057 060 points. A further two data points (trades) were 
excluded because date abnormalities. 
9.6 Trade information  
9.6.1 Identification and Review of Trades 
During the period under review, 97.6% of trades were either “Automated” or “Auction” trades. 
While these trades may not always result from orders entered in the JSE’s order book (for example, 
“Fill or kill” orders), these trades have resulted from “normal” JSE trading. They reflect the result 
of orders placed by individuals and institutions in reaction to market conditions, and have been 

























The remaining 2.5% of trades (a staggering 29.6% by volume) are, for example, correcting entries, 
of exceptional size (“Off order book” or “Block: trades) or late trades. They do not impact the 
calculation of the day’s high, low and close (Moneymax, 2003; JSE 2003C) and are frequently not 
matched in the market – occurring instead as the result of rights issues or takeovers. Furthermore, 
the price that these orders occur at are frequently dramatically different to the ruling price in the 
market on that day. Refer to “Trade Types” on page 73, in the Appendix, for a complete definition 
of trade types. 
All trade data points in 
initial sample 
Number of Trades Volume 
All trade types                      2 145 801                   30 236 722 244  
AT and UT trades                      2 094 982                   22 586 609 229  
 97.63% 74.70% 
   
Data points for shares 
eventually included in "the 
sample" (see page 43) 
Number of Trades Volume 
All trade types                      1 841 208                   21 538 730 973  
AT and UT trades                      1 795 810                   15 173 561 553  
 97.53% 70.45% 
Figure 11 Automated and Auction Trades 
 
This study concerns itself with the impact of news on investor sentiment. Investor sentiment will 
drive investor decisions, which, in turn, will be reflected in trades that match in the market. As 
“Automated” and “Auction” trades constitute trades initiated by investors during the normal course 
of trading, the study will restrict its analysis to trades of these types. 
Trades were identified as follows: 
 Trade details were extracted from the JSE Trade Report system for trades occurring between 
15 November 2002 and 31 July 2003. 
 This initial population consisted of 2 145 801 trades. 
 186 384 trades were rejected because they occurred on the thirteen days eliminated because 















 Eliminating non “Automated” or “Auction” trades decreased the population by 46 342 
(2.4%) to 1 913 075. (Note that this decrease is greater than the decrease implied in Figure 
11 as the filters below have not yet been applied to this number.) 
 Filtering out warrants further reduced this total to 1 852 479, and then removing the 
remainder of segment ZA04 (Special Instruments) as well as trades from shares not 
correctly allocated to a JSE market segment reduced the remainder to 1 828 428 trades. 
 Removing all records pertaining to companies not listed at both 15 November 2002 and 31 
July 2003 resulted in the deletion of 32 618 trade data points. 
 Our resultant sample consisted of the company, volume and trade date and time for 1 795 
810 trades in 437 equities (unless otherwise noted, this will be referred to as “the sample” or 
“the population”.) 
A brief analysis of the data would suggest that there is a “day-of-the-week” effect evident, with 
Monday and Friday attracting considerably fewer trades than Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday. 
This is illustrated in Figure 12 below. 
 
























The data does not suggest seasonality or “day-of-the-month” effects (Figure 13 below). Two 
exceptions to this are clearly apparent: Christmas and Easter, with the Christmas period appearing 
as a massive trough in Figure 13. 
 
Figure 13 Number of trades per day and 30 day moving average 
9.6.2 Transformation and Manipulation of Data 
The metric defined in Equation 9 on page 31 adjusts for market-wide phenomena (for example 
Christmas) by incorporating an average volume level across all shares in each time period (the 
result of Equation 8). As such, the only further manipulation of this data will be to summarise the 
trade volumes per period for use in Equation 5. 
9.7 SENS Announcements 
9.7.1 Identification and Review of Announcements 




















































































































 The JSE News Control system was studied and 4 210 announcements were identified 
between 15 November 2002, and 31 July 2003 (inclusive). 
 It was confirmed that all 4 210 announcements had a text or body part associated with them, 
implying that they were at least superficially valid SENS announcements). 
 Many SENS announcements contain generic market information (for example, announcing a 
change to the interest rate applicable to funds held with the JSE) or pertain to more than one 
company. 359 announcements fell into this category and were removed. 
 A further 277 were eliminated because they occurred on one of the thirteen days previously 
eliminated because of missing data (see Problems with the data, page 39). 
 24 Records pertaining to shares that were no longer correctly allocated to a market segment, 
or that were pertinent to shares on the Namibian exchange, were eliminated.  
 Of the remaining announcements, companies not listed at both 15 November 2002 and 31 
July 2003 contributed 244 publications. 
 After the data had been adjusted (see “Transformation and manipulation of data” on page 47 
below) to take cognisance of whether the market was open or closed, 47 records moved onto 
the thirteen rejected days, and four announcements moved into August 2003. 
 This left 3 255 SENS announcements made by 393 companies.  
It is interesting to note that, while Anglo American posted the largest number of announcements, no 
company is individually responsible for more than 3% of SENS postings. However, the distribution 
is not even. Figure 14 below reflects the cumulative contribution of  SENS announcements by 
companies, when ordered by number of announcements. It is apparent that 185 companies 
contributed the first 20% of announcements, while only eighteen companies (amongst them, Anglo 















Figure 14 Histogram reflecting fraction of SENS announcements contributed by Companies 
Figure 15 (below) suggests that there is no meaningful day-of-the-week effect. 
 
 





































However, the data below does indicate that the distribution of data during the trading day is skewed 
towards the latter half of the day: 
Before the market opens                      528  16% 
First half of trading day (9 AM to 1 PM)                      914  28% 
Last half of trading day (1 PM to 5 PM)                   1 267  38% 
After the market closes                      597  18% 
   
SENS Announcements initially extracted                   3 306  100% 
   
Moved onto one of 13 rejected days (see below) (47)  
Moved beyond 31 July 2003 (see below) (4)  
   
Total after manipulation of announcement times                   3 255   
Figure 16 Timing of announcements 
It is hoped that the construction of the experiments (9 AM to 1 PM; 11 AM to 3 PM; 1 PM to 5 PM) 
will control for these distributions. 
9.7.2 Transformation and manipulation of data 
If an announcement was made while the market was closed, its impact on supply and demand 
curves can only manifest itself once the market opens. Thus, SENS announcements that occurred 
after the close of the market were considered to have been made at 8:20 AM on the following 
trading day. Similarly, all announcements that took place before the market opened, were 
considered to have been published at 8:30 AM. 
 
1 125 of the 3 306 announcements occurred while the market was closed. Of these, 597 occurred in 














public holiday on what would have been the following trading day. 91 of the announcements 
happened after the market closed on a Friday). 
9.7.3 Categorisation of Periods 
As discussed on page 28, periods were assessed and categorised as follows: 
 As a “News” period if an announcement occurred before the midpoint of “Intraday” periods, 
or before the market opens for full “Trading Day” periods. 
 As a “Rejection” in the event that an announcement was made for this company after the 
midpoint in “Intraday” periods, or during the trading day for “Trading Day” periods. 
 As a “Rejection” if a SENS was published within two hours of the start of an intraday period 
(periods starting at 9 AM will be rejected  if an announcement was made before the market 
opened, or after the market closed on the preceding day). 
 All remaining periods were classified as “No News” periods. 
 
The results of this analysis are shown in Figure 17 below. 
Trading Day: 9 AM through 1 PM  
 Discard 860 1% 
 News 959 1% 
 No News 69623 97% 
  71442  
    
Trading Day: 9 AM through 5 PM  
 Discard 1992 3% 
 News 909 1% 
 No News 68541 96% 














    
9 AM through 1 PM  
 Discard 1440 2% 
 News 379 1% 
 No News 69623 97% 
  71442  
    
1 PM through 5 PM  
 Discard 1184 2% 
 News 423 1% 
 No News 69835 98% 
  71442  
    
11 AM through 3 PM  
 Discard 858 1% 
 News 440 1% 
 No News 70144 98% 
  71442  

















With reference to the formal methodology given in section 8.6, the results may now be reviewed. 
10.1.1 Step 5 






























Trading Day: 9 am to 1 pm -4.1406 -1.4712 -2.7170 -3.6930 -1.3981 -1.6030 -2.2190 -0.8039 
Trading Day: 9 am to 5pm -4.1485 -0.9322 -1.8342 -3.9640 -1.2050 -1.8030 -1.5474 -0.0912 
9 am through 1 pm -2.8368 -2.9405 -0.9186 -2.5011 -2.8368 -1.5738 -1.4421 -1.4859 
1 pm through 5 pm -2.5039 -1.6663 -0.8433 -2.3377 -1.7785 -1.7470 -1.6864 -0.3921 
11 am through 3 pm -2.0735 -0.6726 -1.6393 -1.7766 -1.1352 0.9522 -0.4765 -1.5039 
         
Shares ignore because they 
did not trade 
58 0 0 58 0 0 0 0 















10.1.2 Step 6 
In Figure 18, instances where we may reject the null hypothesis ( ; Firm 
specific SENS announcements have no impact on stock exchange trading volumes on the JSE) and 
accept the alternative hypothesis ( ) at the 1% level of significance, are 
shaded.  
 














Trading Day: 9 AM through 1 PM Reject H0  Reject H0 Reject H0  
Trading Day: 9 AM through 5 PM Reject H0   Reject H0  
Intraday: 9 AM through 1 PM Reject H0 Reject H0  Reject H0 Reject H0 
Intraday: 1 PM through 5 PM Reject H0   Reject H0  
Figure 19 Subset of results 
10.2 Discussion 
It is apparent that the less liquid the sample, the more likely it is that SENS announcements have an 
impact on trading volumes. Notably, we could only reject the null hypothesis in one instance 
(between 9AM and 1PM for the Top 40 index) for the very liquid Top 40, Industrial 25, Resource 
20 and Financial 15 indexes. The following section will speculate as to reasons for this.  
11 Exploration of Results 
The results of the experiment are superficially surprising. On reflection, it is perhaps an outcome 
















In this discussion, shares in the “Top Companies Banding” (ZA01) will be used as a proxy for 
highly liquid shares, and shares in ZA03 (“Less Liquid Banding”) as a proxy for less liquid stocks. 
11.1.1 Public interest 
It is the author’s perception that the larger, more highly liquid companies are generally more 
thoroughly analysed (in newspapers, magazines and online) and discussed than the less liquid 
companies. 
 
At a one percentage level of significance: 
 Shares in ZA01 are more diversified than shares in ZA03 (see “Diversification” on page 60). 
 Shares in ZA01 publish more SENS announcements than the companies in ZA03 (see 
“Announcements” on page 64). 
 Shares in ZA01 have larger market capitalisations than those in ZA03 (see “Market 
Capitalisation” on page 66). 
 
Together, these three points would suggest strongly that the number of stakeholders in companies in 
ZA01 (be they employees, shareholders or even the government) is significantly larger than the 
number of stakeholders in the smaller members of ZA03. This, in turn, bears out the assertion that 
the level of interest, discussion and analysis of these companies is higher than that of companies in 
ZA03. 
 
Hence, for highly liquid companies, the market will anticipate announcements (which, despite the 
best intentions of the JSE, would have been preceded by considerable rumour and discussion). 















This conclusion also accords with Jensen and Ruback (1983), The Securities and Exchange 
Commission (1987) and Comment (1986) (all in Bhana, 1999A) who suggest that publicly available 
information (rather than insider trading) is a significant driver of price run-ups in anticipation of  
merger announcements.  
11.1.2 Types of SENS Announcement 
A detailed review of the SENS data yielded surprising results. Most notably, there is a large volume 
of “noise” announcements. For example, many companies use the mechanism as a public relations 
channel: 
 On 29 November 2002: “Harmony Directors Buy First ADRs On NYSE.” 
 On 18 November 2002: “Net1 Applied Technology Holdings Limited ("Aplitec") is pleased 
to announce that it has been selected as the exclusive provider of smart card based financial 
delivery systems, to showcase its desire and ability to partner with Commonwealth 
Governments...” 
 On 1 April 2003: “Gold Fields to Extend Anti Retroviral Programme” 
 On 21 July 2003: “ABSA Group Limited - ABSA leads fight against internet fraud” 
 
Equally, the service is used to broadcast the dates of meetings and announcements. For example: 
 On 6 February 2003: The Afrikander Lease Limited, “Notice of Shareholders Meeting” 
 On 15 May 2003: Old Mutual: “Announcement of Trading Update and Analysts Conference 
Call” 















Of course, all announcements contain content that may be crucial to an investor. However, this 
author would speculate that the announcement of a meeting or analysts conference call can 
frequently be anticipated by the market, and will often provide little information that is not already 
in the public domain (certainly, any information that was not in the public domain would have first 
to be published as a SENS announcement before it could be discussed with the analysts (JSE 
2003C).  
 
To explore this further, all the announcements were categorised into five groupings: 
 News: Concerning the dates of meetings, press and media releases as well as announcements 
that would have been anticipated by the media, or that concerned the normal operation of a 
business (22 May 2003: “Strike Action At Drd’S Buffelfontein Mine”; 2 June 2003: “Ticor 
South Africa’s Furnace Ramp-Up Ahead of Schedule”). 
 Financial: Including the publication of audited and un-audited financial results and trading 
updates, the raising of capital and debt and changes to the financial structure. 
 Directors: Changes to management and the board of directors. 
 Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A): Cautionaries, the withdrawal of cautionaries, and 
announcements detailing mergers, acquisitions, disposals and major partnerships. 
















Figure 20 Categorisation of SENS Announcements 
The experiments were then rerun and the news, no news means compared for each category. 
However, since it had already been established that less liquid shares react strongly to 
announcements, the experiments were only repeated for high liquidity stocks (members of the Top 
Companies banding). The experiment and results are set out formally in the appendix: “ Analysis of 
the Categorisation of SENS Announcements” on page 69. 
 
The results were extremely tepid with only three period categorisation pairs showing a distinction in 
the means at the 5% level (two at a 1% level). Again, the author speculates that this is a symptom of 


























Several information driven theoretical models were initially introduced. The role of information in 
the market and the practical impact of information on trading was discussed. Against this context, it 
was particularly apparent that, of all news types, SENS announcements should impact the market. 
 
Curiously, it was observed that the market: 
 Reacted strongly to announcements concerning small, thinly traded stocks; and, 
 Did not discernibly react to announcements pertaining to large, heavily traded companies, 
irrespective of the type of the nature of the announcement.  
 
This author postulates that this provides evidence (in the short term) of strong-form market 
efficiency amongst the more liquid stocks on the JSE, and to weak-form efficiency (in the short 
term), for smaller companies. These differences are, while perhaps to be expected, nonetheless 
extremely insightful: 
 Smaller companies offer far greater opportunities for insider trading, which in turn increases 
the risks associated with trading these counters. 
 Clearly information impacts the market. But, to the extent that big companies are diversified 
conglomerates of small companies, this author speculates that the impact of changes in 
perceptions is averaged away within larger companies. This effect may justify the “blue-
chip” reputation of many South African corporations but it masks the true impact of 
information, creating significant challenges for researchers. 
 Since trading volumes are synonymous with investors adjusting their expectations and 
perceptions, it is reasonable to assume that announcements by small companies contain 















Equations 4 and 5 respectively) in reaction to new information. Which must result in greater 
variances in valuations built using either of these models. Hence, for low liquidity stocks, 
this author would question the use of Dividend Discount Model (or Discounted Cash Flow 
Model) as a valuation technique.  
12.1 Areas for further study 
12.1.1 The Impact of Price Changes 
This study makes no statement about either the impact of news on prices, or the impact of price 
changes on trading volume. Karpoff notes (1987: 120): 
 There is a correlation between (volume) and  (the absolute value of a change in 
price). 
 The correlation is between (volume) and  (the change in price). 
 is higher when prices increase than when prices decrease. 
It would be interesting to explore these relationships in more detail.  
12.1.2 Good and Bad News 
Ferreira (1999) classifies news as either good (having a positive impact on price) or bad (the 
opposite).  Perhaps buying and selling by directors could be used as a proxy for good and bad news, 
respectively. 
12.1.3 Diversification 
As noted previously, the diversification of companies may mask the impact of news within the 
market. It would be interesting to examine the relative levels of diversification of South African and 














12.1.4 Factor Analysis 
This study has only speculated as to the causes of the results. It may be possible to utilise factor 

















There is no single indicator of the level of diversification of a company. A proxy variable is 
required. To this end, the number of subsidiaries and holdings of companies will be used. Hence, 
we can construct H0 and H1: 
 
H0: Companies falling into the “Top Companies” (ZA01) JSE banding have the same level of 
diversification as companies in the “Less Liquid” (ZA03) banding. 
H1: Companies falling into the “Top Companies” (ZA01) JSE banding have a greater level of 
diversification than companies in the “Less Liquid” (ZA03) banding. 
 
This can immediately be restated as: 
 
H0: Companies falling into the “Top Companies” (ZA01) JSE banding have the same number of 
holdings and investments as companies in the “Less Liquid” (ZA03) banding. 
 




We will perform a one-tailed test of significance to explore whether the mean number of 
subsidiaries, investments and holding, per company, for companies in ZA01, differs from the mean 
















As for the primary study, the data was provided by Moneymax. Only companies in the population 
of the primary study were examined. 
 
This dataset included data on 455 companies. It details the percentage ownership of the parent 
company in the entity with which it has the relationship. The relationship is given as: 
 Direct subsidiary 
 Associate 
 Indirect subsidiary 
 Investment 
The parent company may have more than one of these relationships with the same subsidiary, each 
with a different percentage ownership. Because of this confusion, the experiment was constructed to 
look at the average number of child entities per parent company. 
Further, the child entities are frequently not listed companies. 
  ZA01 ZA03 
Initial number of parent companies                     39                327  
Initial number of child companies                1 950              4 254  
Parent companies included in primary study                     38                292  
Child companies relevant to primary study                1 931              3 847  
Figure 21 Summary of data 
13.1.3 The Test 
Step 1 























We will use a one-tailed test of significance, at the 1% level: . 
Step 3 
  (15) 
 
  (16) 
Where:  
  Mean number of subsidiaries in the “ZA01” sample. 
  Standard deviation of sample. 
  Number of elements in sample. 
  Standard error of the differences of sample means (the standard 










































Reject H0 if z > 2.33. 
Step 5: Calculate Z 
Banding ZA01 ZA03 
Companies in sample ( ) 38 292 
Mean ( ) 
51.5263 15.2603 
Standard Deviation ( ) 47.4437 14.73596 
Figure 22 Summary statistics 
 
From Equation 16: 
  (17) 
 
and hence (from Equation 15): 
 
  (18) 
 
Step 6 
Z far exceeds 2.33. We are able to reject H0, and accept H1: . 
13.1.4 Discussion 
It is very clear from Step 6 that companies within the “Top Company” banding have very 
significantly more holdings and subsidiaries that their less liquid counterparts in ZA03. In so far as 














































hypothesis and conclude that there is a greater level of diversification amongst companies within 
ZA01. 
13.2 Announcements 
It would seem that the more liquid “Top Companies” publish more announcements than the 
companies in the less liquid “Less Liquid” banding. We can construct null and alternative 
hypotheses as follows: 
H0: Companies falling into the “Top Companies” (ZA01) JSE banding publish as many SENS 
announcements as companies in the “Less Liquid” (ZA03) banding. 
H1: Companies falling into the “Top Companies” (ZA01) JSE banding publish more SENS 
announcements as companies in the “Less Liquid” (ZA03) banding. 
 
Formally, this becomes: 
  (19) 
13.2.1 Methodology 
Again, a one-tailed Z-test of significance will be employed to examine the difference between the 
means of the two populations. 
13.2.2 Data 
The same dataset will be employed as was used in the primary study. 
























  (20) 
Step 2 
We will use a one-tailed test of significance, at the 1% level: . 
Step 3 
  (21) 
 
  (22) 
 
Where:  
  Mean number of SENS announcements made by companies 
grouped by the JSE into “ZA01”. 
  Standard deviation of sample. 
  Number of elements in sample. 
  Standard error of the differences of sample means (the standard 
deviation of the differences of the sample means). 
 
Step 4 
Reject H0 if z > 2.33. 
Step 5: Calculate Z 
Banding ZA01 ZA03 
















































Mean ( ) 
19 6.4249 
Standard Deviation ( ) 18.2588 4.5117 
Figure 23 Summary statistics 
 
From Equation 22: 
  (23) 
 
and hence (from Equation 21): 
 
  (24) 
 
Step 6 
Again, z far exceeds 2.33. We are able to reject H0, and accept H1: . 
13.2.4 Discussion 
As we had intuitively anticipated, companies within ZA01 publish far more announcements than 
companies within ZA03. 
13.3 Market Capitalisation 
It would seem reasonable to presume that the highly liquid members of ZA01 have larger market 
capitalisations than the members of ZA03. 
 













































H0: There is no difference in the market capitalisations of ZA01 and ZA03. 
H1: The market capitalisation of ZA01 shares exceeds the market capitalisation of shares in ZA03. 
 
Formally: 
  (25) 
13.3.1 Methodology 
Since the dataset (below) is relatively small, a one-tailed T-test of significance will be employed to 
examine the difference between the means of the two populations. 
13.3.2 Data 
























ZA01  ZA03 
Company Market Cap Rm  Company Market Cap Rm 
ABI                           9 274.21   COPI                                 1 669.92  
ANGLO                       195 934.07   CULIN55%P                                       0.30  
BHPBILL                       120 075.35   DORBL55%P                                       1.09  
INVLTD                           3 839.95   DORBYL                                   522.27  
INVPLC                           7 426.06   DORBYL5%P                                       0.70  
ISCOR                           9 053.23   EERSLNG                                       2.79  
KUMBA                           9 799.77   EUREKA                                     36.00  
LIBINT                         23 709.09   FORIM                                     41.50  
MTN                         28 323.00   FREDDEV                                     92.24  
OLDMUTUAL                         42 154.86   HUDACO                                   580.51  
RICHEMONT                         73 654.20   HYPROP                                 1 059.21  
SAB                         53 835.52   INMINS                                     53.79  
SANLAM                         19 909.28   ITLTILE                                 1 214.02  
STANBANK                         42 795.02   JASCO                                     64.15  
WOOLIES                           5 846.92   Z-C-I                                   189.30  
Figure 24 Sample Market Capitalisations  of ZA01 and ZA03 
Step 1 
  (26) 
Step 2 
A one-tailed test will be employed at the 1% level of significance ( ). 
Step 3 and 4 


























Degrees of freedom: 28. 
. 
Step 6 
We may reject H0. 
13.3.3 Discussion 
Again, the result accords with our intuition. Unsurprisingly, companies included the JSE Top 
Companies banding have greater market capitalizations than those in the less liquid banding. 
13.4  Analysis of the Categorisation of SENS Announcements 
Intuitively, it would seem that announcements about mergers and acquisitions would cause 
dramatically greater trading volumes than announcements about the date of an Annual General 
Meeting or presentation. Although such differences, if they exist, would be irrelevant if neither 
category differed materially from non-news averages. 
 
In order to establish if trading volumes are impacted more dramatically by one type of SENS, the 
announcements were grouped into five categories: 
 News: Concerning the dates of meetings, press and media releases as well as announcements 
that would have been anticipated by the media, or that concerned the normal operation of a 
business (22 May 2003: “Strike Action At Drd’S Buffelfontein Mine”; 2 June 2003: “Ticor 
South Africa’s Furnace Ramp-Up Ahead of Schedule”). 
 Financial: Including the publication of audited and un-audited financial results and trading 
updates, the raising of capital and debt and changes to the financial structure. 















 Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A): Cautionaries, the withdrawal of cautionaries, and 
announcements detailing mergers, acquisitions, disposals and major partnerships. 
 Remuneration: Dealings by directors, as well as changes to their option structures. 
 
The result of this assessment is presented numerically below, and graphically in Figure 20 on page 
56. 
 ZA01 ZA02 ZA03 
Entire 
Market 
Remuneration 222 184 502 908 
M&A 91 107 301 499 
Directors 91 95 244 430 
Financial 158 228 476 862 
News 188 123 227 538 
Unclassified 10 4 4 18 
 760 741 1 754 3 255 
Figure 25 Result of SENS Categorisation 
 
In the same manner that the null and alternate hypotheses were constructed for the primary 
experiments in this study (see section 8.6 on page 31 describing the formal methodology 
employed), null and alternate hypotheses were constructed for each category: 
 
The mean level of abnormal trading should be greater in samples where announcements of a 























A single-tailed Z-test of significance will be employed to examine the difference between the means 
of the two populations (see page 32). 
13.4.2 Data 
The same dataset will be employed as was used in the primary study. However, as strong results 
have already been obtained for less liquid stocks, only the constituents of the JSE Top Companies 
banding (“ZA01”) were considered. 







We will use a single tailed test of significance, at the 5% level: . 
 
Step 3 
  (11) 
 





























  Mean of the “No News” sample. 
  Standard deviation of sample. 
  Number of elements in sample. 
  Standard error of the differences of sample means (the standard 
deviation of the differences of the sample means). 
 
Step 4 
Reject H0 if z < -1.645. 
Step 5: Calculate Z 
 Remuneration M&A Directors Financial News 
Trading Day: 9 am to 1 pm 1.0188 -1.2319 -1.4424 -1.3572 -0.1859 
Trading Day: 9 am to 5pm 1.1123 -0.9320 -1.5183 -1.5488 -0.4344 
9 am through 1 pm -1.6582 0.6476 -0.8522 -1.5383 -2.4334 
1 pm through 5 pm -0.7422 0.0611 -1.4027 -1.3898 -0.8637 
11 am through 3 pm -0.3331 -0.2244 -2.8156 0.3180 -1.5563 
Figure 26 Z-Values for Categorised SENS Announcements 
Step 6 
At the 95% confidence level, we only reject our null hypothesis in three instances. These are 
highlighted in Figure 26 above. At a 99% level (-2.326), we only reject it twice. 
13.4.4 Discussion 
This relatively weak result corroborates our earlier findings. It suggests that, irrespective of the 


















13.5 Trade Types 
Source: Moneymax (2003). 
Only Automated Trades (AT) and Auction Trades (UT) constitute high, low and close. All trade 
types contribute to the volume, number and value of trades.  
AT Automated 
Trade 




A transaction matched automatically in the JSE trading system during price 
determination in an auction. 
PF Portfolio 
Trade 




A transaction where a broking member (equities) trades as an agent in a single 
security where the transaction 
 has a minimum value of R5 million, and  
 comprises at least 100% of the average daily value.  




A transaction where a broking member (equities) trades as a principal in a 
single security where the transaction 
 has a minimum value of R500.00, and  
 comprises at lease six times the normal market size (NMS),  
except where the transaction is with a foreign professional market participant 
in which case no minimum value or quantity of security applies.  














trades used previously. Delayed publication rules apply, depending on NMS.  
LT Late Trade A transaction where broking member (equities) traded after hours with a 
professional market participant, as agent or principal, in fulfilment of 
 an order already entered into the JSE trading system which reflects 
a reasonable price at which a client wishes to trade,  
 an order received prior to the end of the closing auction call 
period, the price of which could only be established after the 
closing auction call period, or  
 order received after hours.  
CT Contra 
Trade 
A transaction that is equal and opposite to a previously matched automated or 
auction trade that is entered on the same day as the original trade. Both parties 
to the trade are involved and will have to flag the trade as "CT" which will 
then be matched by the system. 
PC Post Contra 
Trade 
A transaction that is equal and opposite to a previously matched automated or 




13.6  Descriptive Statistics 
 Experiment Category  Number   Mean   Standard 
Deviation  














 Trading Day: 9 am to 1 pm News            948       1.4724           11.0834  
 Trading Day: 9 am to 1 pm No News       68 019      -0.0205             5.3884  
 Trading Day: 9 am to 5pm News            903       1.4795           10.8450  
 Trading Day: 9 am to 5pm No News       67 745      -0.0197             4.9211  
 9 am to 1 pm News            377       1.2916             8.8802  
 9 am to 1 pm No News       67 859      -0.0072             5.4789  
 1 pm to 5 pm News            421       0.9711             7.9947  
 1 pm to 5 pm No News       67 739      -0.0060             5.7398  
 11 am to 3 pm News            436       0.8266             8.3658  
 11 am to 3 pm No News       67 076      -0.0054             5.6467  
      
Top Companies (ZA01)     
 Trading Day: 9 am to 1 pm News            225       0.0984             1.0123  
 Trading Day: 9 am to 1 pm No News         6 053      -0.0037             1.2422  
 Trading Day: 9 am to 5pm News            205       0.0481             0.7476  
 Trading Day: 9 am to 5pm No News         5 842      -0.0017             0.8419  
 9 am to 1 pm News             92       0.4052             1.3330  
 9 am to 1 pm No News         6 053      -0.0062             1.2415  
 1 pm to 5 pm News             89       0.1650             0.9420  
 1 pm to 5 pm No News         6 145      -0.0024             0.8718  
 11 am to 3 pm News             96       0.0797             1.1687  
 11 am to 3 pm No News         6 183      -0.0012             1.2218  
      
Medium Liquid (ZA02)     
 Trading Day: 9 am to 1 pm News            222       0.6241             3.4615  
 Trading Day: 9 am to 1 pm No News       13 203      -0.0105             2.7730  
 Trading Day: 9 am to 5pm News            211       0.3009             2.4086  
 Trading Day: 9 am to 5pm No News       12 952      -0.0049             1.9789  














 9 am to 1 pm No News       13 203      -0.0015             2.7997  
 1 pm to 5 pm News             87       0.1516             1.6779  
 1 pm to 5 pm No News       13 240      -0.0010             2.2229  
 11 am to 3 pm News             97       0.5037             3.0397  
 11 am to 3 pm No News       13 336      -0.0037             2.6586  
      
Less Liquid (ZA03)     
 Trading Day: 9 am to 1 pm News            501       2.4475           14.9734  
 Trading Day: 9 am to 1 pm No News       48 763      -0.0251             6.1760  
 Trading Day: 9 am to 5pm News            487       2.5946           14.5767  
 Trading Day: 9 am to 5pm No News       48 951      -0.0258             5.6865  
 9 am to 1 pm News            209       2.0245           11.7453  
 9 am to 1 pm No News       48 603      -0.0087             6.2851  
 1 pm to 5 pm News            245       1.5452           10.3878  
 1 pm to 5 pm No News       48 354      -0.0078             6.6794  
 11 am to 3 pm News            243       1.2477           10.9939  
 11 am to 3 pm No News       47 557      -0.0064             6.5351  
      
Top 40 (J200)     
 Trading Day: 9 am to 1 pm News            233       0.0924             1.0231  
 Trading Day: 9 am to 1 pm No News         6 196      -0.0035             1.1554  
 Trading Day: 9 am to 5pm News            212       0.0622             0.7649  
 Trading Day: 9 am to 5pm No News         5 976      -0.0022             0.7740  
 9 am to 1 pm News             98       0.3722             1.3113  
 9 am to 1 pm No News         6 196      -0.0059             1.1546  
 1 pm to 5 pm News             91       0.1756             0.9503  
 1 pm to 5 pm No News         6 292      -0.0025             0.8282  
 11 am to 3 pm News             99       0.1323             1.1699  














      
Industrial 25 (J211)     
 Trading Day: 9 am to 1 pm News             73       0.3885             2.0988  
 Trading Day: 9 am to 1 pm No News         3 726      -0.0076             1.6366  
 Trading Day: 9 am to 5pm News             71       0.2569             1.2154  
 Trading Day: 9 am to 5pm No News         3 619      -0.0050             1.0372  
 9 am to 1 pm News             43       0.3357             1.4037  
 9 am to 1 pm No News         3 726      -0.0039             1.6417  
 1 pm to 5 pm News             38       0.4286             1.5239  
 1 pm to 5 pm No News         3 732      -0.0044             1.0681  
 11 am to 3 pm News             43      -0.1498             1.0292  
 11 am to 3 pm No News         3 759       0.0017             1.5921  
      
Resource 20 (J210)     
 Trading Day: 9 am to 1 pm News            138       0.3394             1.8291  
 Trading Day: 9 am to 1 pm No News         3 002      -0.0156             2.0149  
 Trading Day: 9 am to 5pm News            124       0.1568             1.1354  
 Trading Day: 9 am to 5pm No News         2 906      -0.0067             1.4919  
 9 am to 1 pm News             44       0.5077             2.3555  
 9 am to 1 pm No News         3 002      -0.0074             2.1326  
 1 pm to 5 pm News             42       0.4655             1.8039  
 1 pm to 5 pm No News         3 079      -0.0063             1.5803  
 11 am to 3 pm News             46       0.0673             0.9427  
 11 am to 3 pm No News         3 094      -0.0010             1.9513  
      
Financial 15 (J212)     
 Trading Day: 9 am to 1 pm News             77       0.0952             1.0590  
 Trading Day: 9 am to 1 pm No News         2 289      -0.0032             0.9699  














 Trading Day: 9 am to 5pm No News         2 220      -0.0003             0.6859  
 9 am to 1 pm News             27       0.2840             0.9994  
 9 am to 1 pm No News         2 289      -0.0034             0.9709  
 1 pm to 5 pm News             28       0.0402             0.5415  
 1 pm to 5 pm No News         2 321      -0.0005             0.8284  
 11 am to 3 pm News             32       0.3330             1.2656  
 11 am to 3 pm No News         2 337      -0.0046             0.8670  
      
Remuneration (ZA01)     
 Trading Day: 9 am to 1 pm News             60      -0.0989             0.7498  
 Trading Day: 9 am to 1 pm No News         6 365       0.0009             1.2310  
 Trading Day: 9 am to 5pm News             55      -0.0934             0.6236  
 Trading Day: 9 am to 5pm No News         6 278       0.0008             0.8342  
 9 am to 1 pm News             28       0.5471             1.7516  
 9 am to 1 pm No News         6 365      -0.0024             1.2288  
 1 pm to 5 pm News             43       0.0833             0.7373  
 1 pm to 5 pm No News         6 359      -0.0006             0.8727  
 11 am to 3 pm News             25       0.0959             1.4429  
 11 am to 3 pm No News         6 381      -0.0004             1.2143  
      
M&A (ZA01)     
 Trading Day: 9 am to 1 pm News             29       0.3464             1.5188  
 Trading Day: 9 am to 1 pm No News         6 419      -0.0016             1.2345  
 Trading Day: 9 am to 5pm News             28       0.1868             1.0638  
 Trading Day: 9 am to 5pm No News         6 397      -0.0008             0.8318  
 9 am to 1 pm News             15      -0.1007             0.6006  
 9 am to 1 pm No News         6 419       0.0002             1.2367  
 1 pm to 5 pm News               9      -0.0087             0.4275  














 11 am to 3 pm News             17       0.0777             1.4297  
 11 am to 3 pm No News         6 439      -0.0002             1.2110  
      
Directors (ZA01)     
 Trading Day: 9 am to 1 pm News             21       0.2892             0.9191  
 Trading Day: 9 am to 1 pm No News         6 436      -0.0009             1.2318  
 Trading Day: 9 am to 5pm News             21       0.2330             0.7039  
 Trading Day: 9 am to 5pm No News         6 393      -0.0008             0.8344  
 9 am to 1 pm News               7       0.2472             0.7673  
 9 am to 1 pm No News         6 436      -0.0003             1.2317  
 1 pm to 5 pm News             12       0.3409             0.8426  
 1 pm to 5 pm No News         6 421      -0.0006             0.8743  
 11 am to 3 pm News             16      -0.3211             0.4533  
 11 am to 3 pm No News         6 445       0.0008             1.2114  
      
Financial (ZA01)     
 Trading Day: 9 am to 1 pm News             59       0.1331             0.7507  
 Trading Day: 9 am to 1 pm No News         6 379      -0.0012             1.2379  
 Trading Day: 9 am to 5pm News             59       0.1200             0.5954  
 Trading Day: 9 am to 5pm No News         6 344      -0.0011             0.8335  
 9 am to 1 pm News             29       0.3826             1.3429  
 9 am to 1 pm No News         6 379      -0.0017             1.2390  
 1 pm to 5 pm News             10       0.6067             1.3822  
 1 pm to 5 pm No News         6 434      -0.0009             0.8723  
 11 am to 3 pm News             11      -0.0741             0.7724  
 11 am to 3 pm No News         6 428       0.0001             1.2108  
      
News (ZA01)     














 Trading Day: 9 am to 1 pm No News         6 351      -0.0002             1.2389  
 Trading Day: 9 am to 5pm News             75       0.0403             0.8079  
 Trading Day: 9 am to 5pm No News         6 303      -0.0005             0.8317  
 9 am to 1 pm News             22       0.5181             0.9994  
 9 am to 1 pm No News         6 351      -0.0018             1.2367  
 1 pm to 5 pm News             23       0.2502             1.3932  
 1 pm to 5 pm No News         6 400      -0.0009             0.8658  
 11 am to 3 pm News             28       0.3301             1.1243  
 11 am to 3 pm No News         6 405      -0.0014             1.2125  
13.7  Shares and Market Segments 
Segment 
JSE 
Ticker JSE Short Name Long Name 
ZA01 ABI        ABI 
AMALGAMATED BEVERAGE 
IND 
 ASA        ABSA ABSA GROUP LIMITED 
 ANG        ANGGOLD ANGLOGOLD LTD 
 AGL        ANGLO ANGLO AMERICAN PLC 
 AMS        ANGLOPLAT ANGLO AMERICAN PLATINUM 
 AVG        AVGOLD AVGOLD LTD 
 BAW        BARWORLD BARLOWORLD LTD 
 BIL        BHPBILL BHP BILLITON PLC 
 BVT        BIDVEST BIDVEST LTD ORD 
 FSR        FIRSTRAND FIRSTRAND LTD 
 GFI        GFIELDS GOLD FIELDS LTD 
 HAR        HARMONY HARMONY G M CO LTD 
 IPL        IMPERIAL IMPERIAL HOLDINGS LTD 
 IMP        IMPLATS IMPALA PLATINUM HLGS LD 
 INL        INVLTD INVESTEC LTD 
 INP        INVPLC INVESTEC PLC 
 ISC        ISCOR ISCOR LTD 
 KMB        KUMBA KUMBA RESOURCES LTD 
 LBT        LIB-INT LIBERTY INTERNATIONL PLC 
 LGL        LIBERTY LIBERTY GROUP LTD 
 MTN        MTN GROUP MTN GROUP LTD 
 NPK        NAMPAK NAMPAK LTD ORD 
 NPN        NASPERS-N- NASPERS LTD -N- 
 NED        NEDCOR NEDCOR LTD 
 NTC        NETCARE 
NETWORK HEALTHCARE 
HLDGS 
 OML        OLDMUTUAL OLD MUTUAL PLC 
 PIK        PICKNPAY PIK N PAY STORES LTD 














 REM        REMGRO REMGRO LTD 
 RCH        RICHMON DR RICHEMONT SECURITIES DR 
 RMH        RMBH RMB HOLDINGS LTD 
 SAB        SAB SABMILLER PLC 
 SLM        SANLAM SANLAM LTD 
 SAP        SAPPI SAPPI LTD 
 SOL        SASOL SASOL LTD 
 SBK        STANBANK STANDARD BANK GROUP LTD 
 SHF        STEINHOFF STEINHOFF INTERNTL HLDGS 
 TBS        TIGBRANDS TIGER BRANDS LTD ORD 
 VNF        VENFIN VENFIN LTD 
 WHL        WOOLIES WOOLWORTHS HOLDINGS LTD 
    
ZA02 AFE        A E C I A E C I LTD ORD 
 AVI        A V I A V I 
 ABL        ABIL AFRICAN BANK INVESTMENTS 
 ADR        ADCORP ADCORP HLDGS LTD ORD 
 AFL        AF LEASE AFRIKANDER LEASE LTD 
 AFR        AFGRI AFGRI LTD 
 AFI        AFLIFE AFRICAN LIFE ASSURANCE 
 AFX        AFROX AFRICAN OXYGEN LTD ORD 
 AFB        ALEXFBS ALEXANDER FORBES LTD 
 ALT        ALTECH ALLIED TECHNOLOGIES 
 ATNP       ALTRON PP ALLIED ELECT COR PARTPRF 
 APB        APEXHI B APEXHI PROPERTIES -B- 
 APL        APLITEC NET 1 APPLIED TECHNOLOGY 
 AOD        ARMGOLD ARMGOLD 
 APN        ASPEN ASPEN PHARMACARE HLDGS 
 ARL        ASTRAL ASTRAL FOODS LTD 
 AEG        AVENG AVENG LTD 
 AVS        AVIS AVIS SOUTHERN AFRICA LTD 
 AIN        AVMIN ANGLOVAAL MINING LTD 
 BAT        BRAIT BRAIT S.A. 
 CPT        CAPTALL CAPITAL ALLIANCE HLDG LD 
 CPX        COMPAREX COMPAREX HOLDINGS LTD 
 CPA        CORPCAP CORPCAPITAL LTD 
 DTC        DATATEC DATATEC LTD 
 DUR        DBN DP DURBAN ROODEPT DEEP 
 DEL        DELTA DELTA ELECRICAL IN 
 DDT        DIDATA DIMENSION DATA HLDGS PLC 
 DSY        DISCOVERY DISCOVERY HOLDINGS LTD 
 ECO        EDCON EDGARS CONS STORES LTD 
 ELH        ELERINE ELLERINE HOLDINGS LTD 
 ENR        ENERGY ENERGY AFRICA LTD 
 FOS        FOSCHNI FOSCHINI LTD ORD 
 GRY        GRAYPROP ALLAN GRAY PROPERTY TRST 
 GNK        GRINTEK GRINTEK LTD 
 GRT        GROWPNT GROWTHPOINT PROP LTD 
 HVL        HIVELD HIVELD STEEL AND VANADUM 














 JDG        JDGROUP JD GROUP LTD 
 JCM        JOHNCOM JOHNNIC COMMUNICATIONS 
 JNC        JOHNNIC JOHNNIC HOLDINGS LTD 
 KER        KERSAF KERSAF INVESTMENTS LTD 
 LBH        LIB HOLD LIBERTY HOLDINGS LTD ORD 
 LON        LONMIN LONMIN P L C 
 MUR        M&R HLD 
MURRAY AND ROBERTS H 
ORD 
 MTP        MARTPROP MARTPROP PROPERTY FUND 
 MSM        MASSMART MASSMART HOLDINGS LTD 
 MDC        MEDCLIN MEDI-CLINIC CORP LTD ORD 
 MTC        METCASH METRO CASH AND CARRY 
 MNS        MNET/SS ELEC MEDIA NTW AND SUPSP 
 MPC        MR PRICE MR PRICE GROUP LTD 
 NAC        NAC NEW AFRICA CAPITAL LTD 
 NAN        NAIL -N- NEW AFRICA INVESTMNT-N- 
 NHM        NORTHAM NORTHAM PLATINUM LTD 
 NCL        NUCLICKS NEW CLICKS HLDGS LTD 
 PEP        PEPKOR PEPKOR LTD ORD 
 PGR        PERGRIN PEREGRINE HOLDINGS LTD 
 PWK        PIKWIK PIK N PAY HOLDINGS LTD 
 PMN        PRIMEDIA -N- PRIMEDIA LTD -N- 
 PIM        PRISM PRISM HOLDINGS LTD 
 PSG        PSG PSG GROUP LIMITED 
 RAH        RA HOLD REAL AFRICA HLDGS LTD 
 RBV        REBSERV REBSERV HLDGS LTD 
 RDF        REDEFINE REDEFINE INCOME FUND LTD 
 RLO        REUNERT REUNERT ORD 
 SCE        SACHROME SOUTH AFRICAN CHROME 
 SGG        SAGE SAGE GROUP LTD 
 SNT        SANTAM SANTAM LTD 
 SHP        SHOPRIT SHOPRITE HLDGS LTD ORD 
 SIS        SISA SUN INTERNATIONAL (SA)LD 
 SFT        SOFTLINE SOFTLINE LTD 
 SPG        SUPRGRP SUPER GROUP LTD 
 SYC        SYCOM SYCOM PROPERTY FUND 
 TIW        TIWHEEL TIGER WHEELS LTD 
 TNT        TONGAAT 
TONGAAT-HULETT GROUP 
ORD 
 TDH        TRADEH TRADEHOLD LTD 
 TSX        TRNSHEX TRANS HEX GROUP LTD 
 TRU        TRUWTHS TRUWORTHS INTERNATIONAL 
 USV        UNISERV UNITED SERV TECHNOLOGIES 
 UTR        UNITRAN UNITRANS LTD 
 WAR        W AREAS WESTERN AREAS LTD 
 WBO        WBHO WILSON BAYLY HLM-OVC ORD 
 WET        WETHLYS WETHERLYS INVESTMENT LTD 
 WLO        WOOLTRU WOOLTRU LTD ORD 
 WLN        WOOLTRU-N- WOOLTRU LTD-N- 
    














 APS        ABCPLUS ABC CASH PLUS LTD 
 ACP        ACUCAP ACUCAP PROPERTIES LTD 
 ACY        ACUITY ACUITY GROUP HOLDINGS 
 ADL        ADMIRAL ADMIRAL LEISURE WORLD LD 
 ADO        ADONIS ADONIS KNITWEAR HOLDINGS 
 ADH        ADVTECH ADVTECH LTD 
 AFEP       AECI 5,5%P A E C I 5,5% CUM PREF 
 AOO        AF & OVR AFR AND OSEAS ENTER ORD 
 AON        AF & OVR -N- AFRICAN AND OVERSEAS -N- 
 AOVP       AF&OVR 6%PP AFR AND OSEAS ENT 6PRTPR 
 AFG        AFGEM AFRICAN GEM RESOURCES 
 AGI        AGI AG INDUSTRIES LTD 
 AHH        AHEALTH AFROX HEALTHCARE LTD 
 ALY        ALACRITY ALACRITY FINANCIAL SERVI 
 ALX        ALEXWYT ALEX WHITE HOLDINGS LTD 
 ALN        ALIANCE ALLIANCE PHARMACEUTL ORD 
 ACN        ALIANCE -N- ALLIANCE PHARMACEUTL -N- 
 ALJ        ALL JOY ALL JOY FOODS LTD 
 ATN        ALTRON ALLIED ELECTRONICS CORP 
 ALD        ALUDIE ALUDIE LTD 
 AMA        AMAPS AMALGAMATED APPL HLD LTD 
 AMB        AMB AMB HOLDINGS LTD 
 AME        AME AFRICAN MEDIA ENTERTAIN 
 AEC        ANBEECO 
ANBEECO INVESTMENT 
HLDGS 
 APA        APEXHI A APEXHI PROPERTIES -A- 
 APE        APS-TECH APS TECHNOLOGIES LTD 
 AQU        AQUA AQUA ONLINE HOLDINGS LTD 
 AQL        AQUILA AQUILA GROWTH LTD 
 ART        ARGENT ARGENT INDUSTRIAL LTD 
 ASG        ASSMANG ASSMANG LTD 
 ASR        ASSORE ASSORE LTD 
 AAA        AST GROUP AST GROUP 
 APK        ASTRAPAK ASTRAPAK LTD 
 ATS        ATLAS ATLAS PROPERTIES LTD 
 AVA        AVASA AVASA HOLDINGS LTD 
 AWT        AWETHU 
AWETHU BREWERIES LTD 
ORD 
 BNX        BARNEX BARNATO EXPLORATION LTD 
 BPL        BARPLAT BARPLATS INVESTMENTS ORD 
 BAWP       BARWORLD 6%P BARWORLD LTD 6%CUMPRF 
 BSR        BASREAD BASIL READ HLDGS LTD 
 BRM        BEARMAN BEARING MAN LTD 
 BEG        BEIGE BEIGE HOLDINGS LTD 
 BEL        BELL BELL EQUIPMENT LTD 
 BIC        BICAF BICC CAFCA LTD 
 BJM        BJM BARNARD JACOBS MELLET 
 BNT        BONATLA BONATLA PROPERTY HLDGS 
 BCF        BOWCALF BOWLER METCALF LTD 
 BRC        BRANDCO BRANDCORP HOLDINGS LTD 














 BRN        BRIMSTN-N- BRIMSTONE INVESTMENT -N- 
 BRT        BRIMSTON BRIMSTONE INVESTMNT CORP 
 BRY        BRYANT BRYANT TECHNOLOGY LTD 
 BTG        BTG BYTES TECHNOLOGY GRP LTD 
 BDM        BUILDMAX BUILDMAX LTD 
 BUR        BURLINGT BURLINGTON IND LTD ORD 
 BSB        BUSBY THE HOUSE OF BUSBY LTD 
 CDZ        CADIZ CADIZ HOLDINGS LTD 
 CAE        CAPEMP CAPE EMPOWERMENT TRUST 
 CPL        CAPITAL CAPITAL PROPERTY FUND 
 CPI        CAPITEC CAPITEC BANK HLDGS LTD 
 CRG        CARGO CARGO CARRIERS LTD 
 CSY        CASEY CASEY INVESTMENT HLDGS 
 CSB        CASHBIL CASHBUILD LTD 
 CCG        CCG CCG 
 CMT        CEMENCO CEMENTATION CO AFR LTD 
 CMTP       CEMENCO 6%P 
CEMENTATION CO 
6%CUMPREF 
 CMG        CENMAG CENMAG HOLDINGS LTD 
 CRM        CERAMIC CERAMIC INDUSTRIES LTD 
 CFC        CFC COMMERCIAL FIN CO LTD 
 CHE        CHEMSVE CHEMICAL SERVICES ORD 
 CLH        CITYLDG CITY LODGE HTLS LTD ORD 
 CLE        CLIENTL CLIENTELE LIFE ASSURANCE 
 CMH        CMH 
COMBINED MOTOR HLDGS 
LTD 
 COM        COMAIR COMAIR LTD 
 CMA        COMMAND COMMAND HOLDINGS LTD 
 CPSD       COMPASS D COMPASS PROP HLDG DEB 
 CCL        COMPCLEAR COMPU CLEARING OUTS LTD 
 CNX        CONAFEX CONAFEX HLDGS SOCIE ANON 
 CNC        CONCOR CONCOR LTD RCON 
 CNF        CONFED CONGELLA FEDERATION LTD 
 CNFP       CONFED 6%P CONGELLA FED 6% CUM PREF 
 CCT        CONNECT CONNECTION GROUP HLDGS 
 CNL        CONTROL CONTROL INSTRUMENTS GRP 
 CAN        COPI CANADIAN OSEAS PACK ORD 
 CRW        CORWIL CORWIL INVESTMENTS LTD 
 CKS        CROOKES CROOKES BROS LTD 
 CSH        CSHOLDING CS COMPUTER SERVICES HLD 
 CUL        CULINAN CULLINAN HOLDINGS ORD 
 CULP       CULINAN5,5%P 
CULLINAN 
HLDG5,5%CUMPREF 
 CYD        CYCAD CYCAD FINANCIAL HLDGS LD 
 DAW        DAWN DISTRIBUTION AND WAREHSG 
 DCT        DCENTRIX DATACENTRIX HOLDINGS LTD 
 DEC        DECILLION DECILLION LTD 
 DECD       DECILLION CD DECILLION LTD CONV DEB 
 DGC        DIGICOR DIGICORE HOLDINGS LTD 
 DST        DISTELL DISTELL GROUP LTD 














 DON        DON DON GROUP LTD 
 DLV        DORBYL DORBYL LTD ORD 
 DLVP       DORBYL 5%P DORBYL LTD 5% CUM PREF 
 DLP1       DORBYL 5,5%P DORBYL LTD 5,5% CUM PREF 
 ECH        EC-HOLD EC-HOLD LTD 
 ECOP       EDCON 6%P EDGARS CONS 6% CUMPREF 
 ETH        EDUTECH NOVA EDUC AND TECH HLDS 
 ESL        EERSLNG EERSTELING GOLD MIN CO 
 ELR        ELBGROUP ELB GROUP LTD ORD 
 ELX        ELEXIR ELEXIR TECHNOLOGY HLDGS 
 ENV        ENSERV ENVIROSERV HOLDINGS LTD 
 EOH        EOH ENTERPRISE OUTSOURCING H 
 ERM        ERM ENTERPRISE RISK MNGMENT 
 ERP        ERP.COM ERP.COM HOLDINGS LTD 
 EUR        EUREKA EUREKA IND LTD ORD 
 EXL        EXCELL EXCELLERATE HLDGS LTD 
 EPL        EXPLORER 
EXPLORER CORPORATION 
HLD 
 FVT        FAIRVEST FAIRVEST PROPERTY HLDGS 
 FLC        FALCON FALCON INV HLDG SOC ANON 
 FRT        FARITEC FARITEC HOLDINGS LTD 
 FOM        FORIM FORIM HOLDINGS LTD 
 FOSP       FOSCHNI6,5%P FOSCHINI LTD 6,5%CUMPREF 
 FRE        FREDDEV F STATE DEV AND INV ORD 
 FRO        FRONTRNGE FRONTRANGE LIMITED 
 GMF        GENCOR GENCOR LTD 
 GLB        GILBOA GILBOA 
 GMB        GLENMIB GLENRAND M.I.B. LTD 
 GDA        GLODINA GLODINA HOLDINGS LTD 
 GLT        GLOTEC GLOBAL TECHNOLOGY LTD 
 GLL        GLOVIL GLOVIL 
 GLE        GOLD EDGE GOLD EDGE 
 GDF        GOLDREEF GOLD REEF CASINO RESORTS 
 GDC        GOODCAP GOOD CAPE LTD 
 GND        GRINDROD GRINDROD LTD 
 GNN        GRINDROD -N- GRINDROD LTD -N- 
 GRF        GROUP 5 GROUP FIVE LTD ORD 
 HCL        HERCOL HERITAGE COLLECTION HLDG 
 HWN        HOWDEN HOWDEN AFRICA HLDGS LTD 
 HDC        HUDACO HUDACO INDUSTRIES LTD 
 HYP        HYPROP HYPROP INVESTMENTS LTD 
 IDI        IDION IDION TECHNOLOGY HLDGS 
 IFR        IFOUR IFOUR PROPERTIES LTD 
 ILA        ILIAD ILIAD AFRICA LTD 
 IMR        IMR IMR INVESTMENTS LTD 
 ICT        INCENT INCENTIVE HOLDINGS LTD 
 IDQ        INDEQTY INDEQUITY GROUP LTD 
 IND        INDFIN INDEPENDENT FINANCIAL SE 
 IFW        INFOWAVE INFOWAVE HOLDINGS LTD 
 INM        INMINS INMINS LTD ORD 















 ITG        INTEGREAR INTEGREAR LTD 
 ITV        INTERVID INTERVID LTD 
 ITR        INTRADING INTERTRADING LTD 
 IVT        INVICTA INVICTA HOLDINGS LTD 
 ILT        ISOLUTION INTERCONNECTIVE SOLUTION 
 IST        IST IST GROUP LTD 
 ITE        ITLTILE ITALTILE LTD 
 JSC        JASCO JASCO ELECTRONICS HLDGS 
 JCD        JCI JCI LTD 
 JCDD       JCI CONV DEB JCI LTD S R CONV DEB 
 JGS        JIGSAW JIGSAW HOLDINGS LTD 
 KIR        KAIROS KAIROS INDUSTRIAL HLDGS 
 KLG        KELGRAN KELGRAN LTD 
 KGM        KGMEDIA KAGISO MEDIA LTD 
 KNG        KINGCO KING CONSOLIDATED HLDGS 
 KNGD       KINGCO14%CD KINGCO14%CD 
 KOS        KOLOSUS KOLOSUS HOLDINGS LTD 
 KR         KR KRUGER RAND 
 KRHT       KR HALF KRUGER RAND HALF 
 KRQT       KR QUARTER KRUGER RAND QUARTER 
 KRTT       KR TENTH KRUGER RAND TENTH 
 KWV        KWV BEL KWV BELEGGINGS BEPERK 
 LAR        LA GROUP LA GROUP LTD ORD 
 LAN        LA GROUP -N- LA GROUP LTD -N- 
 LAB        LABAT LABAT AFRICA LTD 
 LBHP       LIB HOLD 11P LIBERTY HLDGS 11C CUMPRF 
 LAF        LONAFRIC LONRHO AFRICA PLC 
 LNF        LONFIN LONDON FIN INV GRP PLC 
 LYS        LYONS LYONS FIN SOLUTIONS HLDG 
 MAF        M & F MUTUAL AND FEDERAL INS 
 MRN        MARSHAL-N- MARSHALLS LTD -N- 
 MSS        MARSHALLS MARSHALLS LTD 
 MAS        MASNITE MASONITE AFRICA LTD ORD 
 MTO        MATHOMO MATHOMO GROUP LTD 
 MTZ        MATODZI MATODZI RESOURCES LTD 
 MEC        MAXTEC MAXTEC LTD 
 MCC        MCCAR MCCARTHY LTD 
 MCCD       MCCAR CD MCCARTHY LTD SCD 
 MCCP       MCCAR CP 
MCCARTHY LTD 
COMCONPREF 
 MCU        MCUBED M CUBED HLDGS LTD 
 MTL        MERCANTIL MERCANTILE LISBON BANK H 
 MES        MESSINA MESSINA LTD 
 MTA        METAIR METAIR INVESTMENTS ORD 
 MTX        METOREX METOREX LTD 
 MPL        METPROL METBOARD PROPERTIES LTD 
 MGX        MGX MGX HOLDINGS LTD 
 MLL        MILLAIR MILLIONAIR CHARTER LTD 
 MMG        MMG MICROMEGA HOLDINGS LTD 














 MBN        MOBILE -N- MOBILE INDUSTRIES -N- 
 MOBD       MOBILE 6%CD MOBILE IND 6% CONV DEB 
 MNY        MONEYWB MONEY WEB HOLDINGS LTD 
 MTE        MONTE 
MONTEAGLE SOCIETE 
ANONYM 
 MRB        MORIBO MORIBO LEISURE LTD 
 MUM        MOULDMED MOULDED MEDICAL SUPPLIES 
 MST        MUSTEK MUSTEK LTD 
 MVL        MVELA RES 
MVELAPHANDA RESOURCES 
LD 
 NAI        NAIL NEW AFRICA INVEST LD ORD 
 NPKP       NAMPAK 6% P NAMPAK LTD 6% CUMPREF 
 NPP1       NAMPAK 6,5%P NAMPAK LTD 6,5% CUMPREF 
 NMS        NAMSEA NAMIBIAN SEA PRODUCTS LD 
 NCS        NICTUS NICTUS BEPERK 
 NWL        NUWORLD NU-WORLD HOLDINGS LTD 
 OKF        OAKFLDS OAKFIELDS THOROUGHBREDS 
 OCE        OCEANA OCEANA GROUP LTD 
 OCT        OCTODEC OCTODEC INVEST LTD 
 OMN        OMNIA OMNIA HOLDINGS LTD 
 OLG        ONELOGIX ONELOGIX GROUP LTD 
 OSI        OSI OSI 
 PAC        PACHOLD PACIFIC HLDGS LTD 
 PAM        PALAMIN PALABORA MINING CO ORD 
 PAL        PALS PALS HOLDING LTD 
 PAP        PANPROP PANGBOURNE PROP LTD 
 PCN        PARACON PARACON HOLDINGS LTD 
 PRA        PARAPROP PARAMOUNT PROP FUND LTD 
 PSC        PASDEC PASDEC RESOURCES SA LTD 
 PET        PETMIN PETRA MINING LTD 
 PHM        PHUMELELA PHUMELELA GAME LEISURE 
 PNC        PINNACLE PINNACLE TECH HLDGS LTD 
 POTP       PORT 5,5%P BRIAN PORTER 5,5%CUMPREF 
 PMM        PREMIUM PREMIUM PROPERTIES LTD 
 PRM        PRIMA PRIMA PROPERTY TRUST 
 PMA        PRIMEDIA PRIMEDIA LTD 
 PMG        PRIMEGRO PRIMEGRO 
 PMV        PRIMESERV PRIMESERV GROUP LTD 
 PRO        PROPER PROPER GROUP LTD 
 PTC        PUTCO PUTCO LTD 
 PPR        PUTPROP PUTCO PROPERTIES LTD 
 QUY        QUYN QUYN HOLDINGS LTD 
 RBW        RAINBOW RAINBOW CHICKEN LTD 
 RNG        RANGOLD RANDGOLD AND EXP CO 
 RCO        RARECO RARE EARTH EXTRACTION CO 
 RLY        RELYANT RELYANT RETAIL LTD 
 RNT        RENTSUR RENTSURE HOLDINGS LTD 
 RLZP       REUNERT5,5%P REUNERT 5,5%CUM PREF 
 RTO        REX TRUE REX TRUEFORM CLOTH ORD 
 RTN        REX TRUE -N- REX TRUEFORM CL CO -N- 















 RPR        RLPROPS RAND LEASES PROP LTD 
 SJL        S&JLAND S AND J LAND HOLDINGS 
 SAE        SA EAGLE SA EAGLE INSURANCE CO 
 SRL        SA RETAIL SA RETAIL PROPERTIES LTD 
 SBL        SABLE SABLE HLDGS LTD ORD 
 SBV        SABVEST SABVEST LTD 
 SVN        SABVEST -N- SABVEST LTD -N- 
 SIR        SAIL GROUP SAIL GROUP LTD 
 SAL        SALLIES SALLIES LTD 
 SMR        SAMRAND 
SAMRAND DEVELOP HLDGS 
LD 
 SAM        SAMROC SA MINERAL RESOURCES COR 
 SSA        SASANI SASANI LTD 
 SFN        SASFIN SASFIN HOLDINGS LTD 
 SCN        SCHAMIN SCHARRIG MINING LTD 
 SER        SEARDEL SEARDEL INVEST CORP LTD 
 SRN        SEARDEL-N- SEARDEL INVST CORP -N- 
 SKJ        SEKUNJALO SEKUNJALO INVESTMENTS LD 
 SLO        SELCO SOUTHERN ELECTRICITY CO 
 STO        SETHOLD 
SETPOINT TECHNOLOGY 
HLDG 
 SHP2       SHOPRIT 5%P SHOPRITE 5% PREF 
 SHP1       SHOPRIT 6%P SHOPRITE 6% PREF 
 SFA        SHOPS SHOPS FOR AFRICA LTD 
 SHP3       SHPRT 2ND5%P SHOPRITE 2ND 5% PREF 
 SHP4       SHPRT 3RD5%P SHOPRITE 3RD 5% PREF 
 SIM        SIMMERS SIMMER AND JACK MINES 
 SMC        SMC SOUTHERN MINING CORP LTD 
 SOV        SOVFOOD SOVEREIGN FOOD INVEST LD 
 SPA        SPANJAARD SPANJAARD LTD 
 SPE        SPEARHD SPEARHEAD PROP HLDGS LTD 
 SUM        SPECTRUM SPECTRUM SHIPPING LTD 
 SPS        SPESCOM SPESCOM LTD 
 SUR        SPURCORP SPUR CORPORATION LTD 
 SQE        SQONE SQUARE ONE SOLUTIONS GRP 
 SBKP       STANBANK6,5%P STD BANK GROUP LTD 6,5%P 
 STE        STEERS STEERS HOLDINGS LTD 
 SLL        STELLA STELLA VISTA TECHNOL LTD 
 STI        STILFTN STILFONTEIN G M CO LTD 
 STA        STRATCORP STRATCORP LTD 
 SBN        SUB N SUB NIGEL GOLD MINING CO 
 SNG        SYNERGY SYNERGY HOLDINGS LTD 
 TRX        TEREXKO TEREXKO LTD 
 TBX        THABEX THABEX EXPLORATION LTD 
 TBSP       TIGBRANDS5,5%P TIGER BRANDS 5,5%CUMPREF 
 TSC        TISEC TISEC LTD 
 TRT        TOURVST TOURISM INV CORP LTD 
 TMT        TREMATON TREMATON CAPITAL INV LTD 
 TRE        TRENCOR TRENCOR LTD 














 TPC        TRNPACO TRANSPACO LTD 
 UCS        UCS UCS GROUP LTD 
 VLT        VALAUTO VAALAUTO LTD 
 VCR        VALCAR VAALTRUCAR LTD 
 VLE        VALUE VALUE GROUP LTD 
 VTL        VENTEL VENTER LEISURE AND COMM 
 VST        VESTA 
VESTA TECHNOLOGY 
HOLDNGS 
 VKG        VIKING VIKING 
 VIL        VILLAGE VILLAGE MAIN REEF G M CO 
 WAN        WANKIE WANKIE COLLIERY LD ORD 
 WBH        WBHOLD W B HOLDINGS LTD 
 WES        WESCOB WESCO INVESTMENTS LTD 
 WNE        WINECORP WINECORP LTD 
 WNH        WINHOLD WINHOLD LTD ORD 
 WLP1       WOLTRU6,75%P WOOLTRU LTD 6,75% PREF 
 WLOP       WOOLTRU 6%P WOOLTRU LTD 6%CUM PREF 
 YRK        YORKCOR YORK TIMBER ORG 
 YHK        YTHRK Y3K GROUP LTD 
 ZPT        ZAPTRONIX ZAPTRONIX LTD 
 ZRR        ZARARA ZARARA 
 ZCI        ZCI ZAMBIA COPPER INV LD ORD 
 ZLT        ZELTIS ZELTIS HOLDINGS LTD 
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